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Director of
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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 31 October 1981

**Top Secret** 

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
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POLAND: Political Maneuvering	
Party leader Jaruzelski yesterday chose a moderate course by not confronting Solidarity with a legal ban on strikes.	25 <b>X</b> 1
He called on the union to heed a parliamentary resolution—which lacks the force of law—demanding an immediate end to strike activity. If that resolution is ignored, he threatened to seek parliamentary authorization for the government to use "extraordinary means of action," something that could point to a legal strike ban or a "state of emergency."	25X1
Jaruzelski, in effect, has temporized on the issue, trying to deflect hardline pressure for an immediate strike ban while forcing Solidarity to control wildcat strikes. At the same time, he has reduced his maneuvering room by publicly committing himself to a tougher course of action if labor unrest continues.	25X1
The regime threat to take away Solidarity's strike weapon could hinder the union leadership's attempts to end continuing wildcat strikes. The union announced Thursday that it will consider disciplinary action to enforce its own ban on strikes. Union militants can argue, however, that such action by the leadership would threate its credibility with the rank and file by creating the impression it is giving in to government threats.	<sub>n</sub> 25X1
Ministerial changes announced by Jaruzelski are partly intended to invigorate management of the economy. Three deputy premiers were given broad powers to oversee economic and trade union affairs.	25X1
Although the changes are also designed to give the appearance of broadening the base of government support, the appointees are not likely to enjoy the confidence of Solidarity and the Church. They include the head of the Communist-allied Democratic Party and an activist from a regime-sponsored Catholic organization.	25X1
Opposition from party hardliners may have prevented Jaruzelski from making more significant changes. He might try instead to bring representatives of Solidarity and the Catholic Church into his proposed new mechanisms for government consultation with representatives of society. Parliament could act on such proposals at its final session today.	25X1
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USSR - WESTERN EUROPE: Gas Pipeline Negotiation	s
Moscow's concessions on Siberian natural gas prices-major hurdlecould bring the pipeline negotiations to a cin time for President Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in late Nov	conclusion
The Soviets and the West Europeans narrowed differences on the base price and price escalation anism earlier this month. The Soviets lowered the price offer to the West German Ruhrgas Company for the \$5.20 per million BTU, but the West German parently are holding out for a price nearer \$4.50	on mech- heir rom s ap-
Moscow also dropped its demand that future princes be tied only to crude oil prices. The insist that the price escalator must be tied to a of alternative fuels if Soviet gas is to be compain their domestic markets.	Europeans a group
Ruhrgas will resolve its remaining differences with the state before mid-November. Ruhrgas believes that Brezlimpending visit will enable it to squeeze additional cessions from the USSR.	nnev's
The government in Bonn also would like to so ment on the project soon, but apparently it is not ing Ruhrgas to conclude a contract. After an agais reached by the Soviets and West Germans, contract with the other European buyers probably will followickly.	ee agree- ot push- reement racts

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FRANCE-AFRICA: Summit in Paris	
High-level talks beginning on Tuesday between senior French and black African officials will focus on the situation in Chad and on African hopes for more French aid.	25X1
Heads of state and representatives from over 25 black African countries are expected to attend. France began annual summit meetings in the early 1970s to keep in touch with its 14 former colonies and to strengthen ties with non-French-speaking states such as Cape Verde and Somalia.	25 <b>X</b> 1
President Mitterrand will urge African leaders to proceed with plans to send an OAU peacekeeping force to Chad as soon as possible. He may announce the extent of French logistic and financial support for troops from Francophone countries such as Senegal and Togo. Paris is looking to the US to underwrite forces provided by Nigeria, a former British possession.	25 <b>X</b> 1
African leaders will voice concern about deteriorating economic conditions and are likely to seek promises of greater aid. They almost certainly will sound out France on additional military aid to counter Libyan subversion in their countries.	25X1
Although some African leaders question the willingness of the Mitterrand government to help them, France has been indicating that it plans to continue substantial project aid and bugetary support.	25X1

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Top Secret 25X1 CHINA-US: Pressure From Beijing Beijing is continuing to try to use the recent Soviet offer to reopen border talks to influence US policy toward the USSR. A Chinese Foreign Ministry 25X1 official told is dissatisfied with conciliatory gestures by the US toward the Soviets. The official said that China will not alter its basic policy toward the USSR but that Beijing's response to the Soviet proposal to reopen border talks will be influenced by its understanding of 25X1 US intentions toward the USSR. 25X1 The official's comments are in line with other signs of Beijing's uneasiness over such US actions as the removal of the grain embargo and reflect concern that arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow could provide the basis for a broadened dialogue. 25X1 THAILAND: Another Troop Alert

Thai troops went on alert yesterday for the second time in a month, apparently to intimidate "young Turk" military officers pardoned following the unsuccessful coup in April. Assistant Commander in Chief Athit, who reportedly ordered the alerts, may be trying to strengthen his own position by appearing to contain a threat to national security and by neutralizing the opposition.

recurrent coup rumors and unsolved bombing incidents have been perpetrated by "young Turks" seeking to undermine the government. These officers, however, do not

have sufficient backing in the military to assume power.

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#### TUNISIA: Legislative Election

The ruling party expects to win a large majority tomorrow in the first contested parliamentary election since 1959. Prime Minister Mzali, the author of the political liberalization program, is counting on the election to strengthen his prospects for eventually succeeding President Bourguiba. Government supporters have harassed and disrupted the efforts of opposition groups, particularly the Social Democrats. The recently legalized Communist Party has shown surprising strength during the campaign.

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OPEC: Impact of Price Accord	
The OPEC price agreement will have no impact on the current soft oil market, although there will be an increase of about \$1 in the weighted average price of OPEC crude oil. It will not affect current OPEC production because the Saudi production cutback from 9.5 million to 8.5 million barrels per day will be balanced by increase from other producers, particularly Nigeria.	
If Algeria and Libya maintain prices at the upper limit of the range, as expected, Nigeria will add as much as 500,000 barrels per day in additional sales in the short term, and Libya and Algeria will eventually be forced to lower prices to be competitive with Nigeria Even with a freeze through 1982, OPEC exports are unlike to rebound before mid-1982. Excess oil stocks are still being drawn down, and oil consumption probably will re-	ely
main depressed through the middle of next year	25X1

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